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Abstract: Security is an essential requirement in mobile ad hoc networks to provide protected communication between 
mobile nodes. Due to unique characteristics of MANETS, it creates a number of consequential challenges to its security 
design. To overcome the challenges, there is a need to build a powerful, multifeatured security solution that achieves both 
broad protection and desirable network performance. MANETs are vulnerable to various attacks, blackhole, is one of the 
possible attacks. Black hole is a type of routing attack where a malicious node advertise itself as having the shortest path 
to all nodes in the environment by sending fake route reply. By doing this, the malicious node can deprive the traffic from 
the source node and can be implemented as a denial-of-service attack where the packets can be dropped later on. In this 
paper, a solution is proposed to identify the malicious node and implanting security against the threats of blackhole by 
notifying other nodes in the network of the incident. The simulation of the proposed algorithm demonstrates that the 
solution prevents the nodes in the network from blackhole attack and also improves the overall performance of AODV in 
the presence of black hole attack. 
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I. Introduction 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of mobile nodes that can instantly establish a network, whenever they 
coexist in the same neighborhood without the need of any fixed infrastructure or centralized administration. The routing 
protocols in an ad hoc network allow the source node to find various routes to the destination with the cooperation of other 
nodes within the network. Due to the random movement of the nodes, the network topology changes rapidly and 
arbitrarily. So, the routing protocol is expected to be able to react to these changes and must facilitate the nodes to identify 
new routes in the network to maintain connectivity. The problem of security in MANETs[2][3] represents a serious 
challenge. This issue arises mainly due to the highly vibrant nature of the ad hoc network and also due to the need to 
operate efficiently with limited number of resources, including network bandwidth, CPU processing capacity, memory and 
battery power (energy) of each individual node in the network. Rapid and frequent routing protocol interaction between 
nodes is required. As wireless ad-hoc networks lack an infrastructure, they are exposed to a lot of attacks and one of 
these kinds of attacks is the Black Hole attack. 
In the Black Hole attack, a malicious node absorbs all data packets in itself, similar to a hole which sucks in everything in. 
In this way, all packets in the network are dropped. A malicious node that drops all the traffic in the network makes use of 
the vulnerabilities of the route discovery packets of the on demand protocols, such as in AODV. In this paper, a new 
approach is defined to identify the malicious node and all the nodes in the network is intimated of the malicious node. The 
packet is then resend and security architecture is applied to the network. The application of security architecture serves as 
the future work. 
II. AODV Routing Protocol 
To carry out a black hole attack, malicious node waits for neighboring nodes to send RREQ messages. When the 
malicious node receives an RREQ message, without checking its routing table, immediately sends a false RREP message 
giving a route to destination over itself, assigning a high sequence number to settle in the routing table of the victim node, 
before other nodes send a true one. Therefore requesting nodes assume that route discovery process is completed and 
ignore other RREP messages and begin to send packets over malicious node. Malicious node attacks all RREQ 
messages this way and takes over all routes. Therefore all packets are sent to a point when they are not forwarding 
anywhere. This is called a black hole similar to real meaning which swallows all objects and matter. To succeed a black 
hole attack, malicious node should be positioned at the center of the wireless network. If malicious node masquerades 
false RREP message as if it comes from another victim node instead of itself, all messages will be forwarded to the victim 
node. If this is done, victim node will have to route all incoming messages and is subjected to a sleep deficit attack.   
III. Security in Ad-Hoc Networks 
The security characteristics of ad-hoc networks are very different to those of traditional infrastructure based wireless 
networks. The absence of a fixed infrastructure due to node mobility implies that nodes cannot rely on information from 
trusted servers such as certification authorities. In this section, we will examine the security challenges facing ad-hoc 
networks.  
One of the most distinct feature of MANET‟s from other static networks is the fact that each node of the  networks 
contributes in making up routes from various sources to destinations or groups of nodes acting as destination. However, 
this distinct feature poses a number of serious threats to the security and privacy of the overall network as well as the 
individual nodes making up the network. The openness of ad hoc networks offers greater flexibility in terms of functionality, 
but it also provides an open path for any malicious node or intruder to gain access to the network and perform activities 
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such as eaves dropping, spoofing, Denial of service attacks, flooding, link failure and many more. To ensure safe 
operation of an ad hoc network, the following minimum constraints should be met  
 Authentication of a node is very important so that the node can be trusted as a valid and trusted node, and 
malicious, eavesdropping nodes are denied access into the network. 
 Data integrity is an important issue, so as to ensure the data communicated between nodes has not been 
tempered or altered by any malicious node. 
 Privacy is also necessary, to ensure that no intermediate node can access the data that is meant for the 
destination of that message. 
 Non-repudiation ensures that the origin of the message cannot deny having sent the message Non-
repudiation is useful for detection and isolation of compromised nodes. When a particular node receives an 
erroneous message from another node, non-repudiation allows the receiver to accuse sender using this message 
and to convince other nodes that the sender is compromised 
IV. Black Hole Attack 
Mobile ad-hoc networks are vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. These attacks include threats against the routing 
mechanism involving the functioning of physical layer, MAC and network layer. These attacks serve the purpose of 
not forwarding the packet and modifying several parameters such as sequence number. Commonly an opponent can 
cause the non-forwarding of a message to other nodes. SO, if the opponent node is selected as a route to send the 
data packet, it denies providing the routing path. Similarly, in the case of Black hole attack, the opponent or the 
malicious node waits for route request (RREQ) packet from its neighboring node and on receiving; it sends a false 
route reply (RREP) packet with a customized sequence number. This gives an illusion to the sender node about the 
new route to the destination. This makes the sender node to ignore the RREP packet from other neighboring node in 
the network and forwards the data packet to the opponent node. The opponent node routes all the packets towards 
itself and blocks the packets to be forwarded anywhere on the network.[15] 
In the following illustrated hypothetical situation, imagine a malicious node „M‟. When node „A‟ broadcasts a RREQ packet 
,both nodes „B‟ and „M‟ receive it .Node „M‟, being a malicious node ,does not check up with its routing table for requested 
route to node „E‟. Hence it immediately sends back a RREP packet, claiming a route to the destination. Node „A‟ receives 
the RREP from „M‟ ahead of the RREP from „C‟ node  
 
 
Figure 1:  Blackhole Attack 
„A‟ assumes that the route through „M ‟is the shortest route and sends any packet to the destination through it. When the 
node „A ‟sends data to „M‟, it absorbs all the data and thus behaves like a black hole. 
V. Proposed Solution 
The proposed solution exploits the packet sequence number included in any packet header. The node in this situation 
needs to have two extra tables; the first table consists of the sequence numbers of the last packet sent to the every node 
in the network, and the second table for the sequence number received from every sender. During the RREP phase, the 
Council for Innovative Research                 International Journal of Computers &Technology 
www.cirworld.com                                Volume 4 No. 2, March-April, 2013, ISSN 2277-3061 
491 | P a g e                                              w w w . i j c t o n l i n e . c o m  
 
1. Set Route Agent RA 
{ 
   pkt_alloc(); //Packet is allocated to RA 
   RA_pkt_init(); //RA initializes the packet for transmission 
   Forward to AODV_Host-1 //Packet is forwarded to host1 
} 
2. AODV_Host-1 
{  
   pkt_recv(); //Host1 receives the packet 
   pkt_resolve(); //Host1 checks if the packet is meant for itself 
   if(Reply_Recvd== NONE) 
   then forward the packet to AODV_Host-2 
} 
3. The packet is kept forwarded to next node if no reply for acceptance is received from the intermediate 
nodes. 
4. AODV_Host-n //Host-n is the destination node 
{ 
   pkt_recv(); 
   broadcasts msg “Packet Received” 
} 
5. If (Reply_Recvd== NONE) 
              packet is assumed to be lost 
Before Resending 
6. Locate Lost_Packet 
{ 
   Check AODV_pkt_Type 
   Check Source Routing Table 
} 
7. Apply Security Constraints 
8. Resend Lost Packet 
9. If (Reply_Recvd==”Packet Received”) 
              EXIT 
 
intermediate or the destination node must include the sequence number of last packet received from the source that 
initiates RREQ. Once the source receives this RREP, it will extract the last sequence number and then compare it with the 
value saved in its table. If it matches the transmission will take place. If not, this replied node is a malicious node, so an 
alarm message will be broadcast to warn the network about this node. Every packet in MANETs has a unique sequence 
number. This number is an increasing value, i.e., the next packet must have higher value that the current packet sequence 
number. The node in regular routing protocols keeps the last packet sequence number that it has received and uses it to 
check if the received packet was received before from the same originating source or not. 
In this solution, every node needs to have two additional small-sized tables; one to keep last-packet-sequence-numbers 
for the last packet sent to every node and the other to keep last-packet-sequence-numbers for the last packet received 
from every node. These tables are updated when any packet is arrived or transmitted. The sender broadcasts the RREQ 
packet to its neighbors. Once this RREQ reach the destination, it will initiate a RREP to the source, and this RREP will 
contain the last-packet-sequence-numbers received from this source. When an intermediate node has a route to the 
destination and receives this RREQ, it will reply to the sender with a RREP contains the last-packet-sequence-numbers 
received from the source by this intermediate node. This solution provides a fast and reliable way to identify the suspicious 
reply. No overhead will be added to the channel because the sequence number itself is included in every packet in the 
base protocol. 
Prelims: The implementation consists of several modules as the packet is broadcasted through route agent from the 
source node. 
 AODV_Host-1 to AODV_Host-m are the „m‟ number of nodes in the network; Host-n is the destination node; Host-u 
is the malicious node. 
 Check AODV_pkt_Type checks the type of packet sent 
 Blackhole_AODV_Host-u() module depicts the working of malicious node 
 pkt_alloc() is the module for packet allocation 
 RA_pkt_init() is the module for packet initialization by the Route Agent 
 pkt_recv() is the module for packet receive 
 pkt_resolve()is the module for resolving the destination node 
VI. Pseudo Code 
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Check AODV_pkt_Type 
{ 
   If AODV_pkt_Type==RREQ) 
             recvReq(x); 
   else if AODV_pkt_Type==RREP) 
             recvReply(x); 
   else if AODV_pkt_Type==ERROR) 
             recvError(x); 
  else if AODV_pkt_Type==”HELLO”) 
             recvHello(x); 
   else print”(Invalid Type”) 
} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. Explanation 
An agent bound to the specific node allocates the packet and initializes the content of the packet. Afterwards the packet is 
handled by the AODV routing mechanism. First the routing handler receives this packet. This is done locally. Afterwards 
the route for the packet is detected. When a suitable route is found, the packet is forwarded to the next hop within this 
route[12]. The pkt_recv() method is the first method called. This method calls first the pkt_resolve() and the forward() 
method.  
This simulation consists of „m‟ hosts that are located in a line, so that Host 1 and Host 3 are not able to communicate 
directly. Within this simulation one TCP packet is send from Host 1 to Host 3 and the reply is send from Host 3 to Host 
1. AODV resolves the route to Host 3 by sending a special request packet. This packet is broadcasted as long as the 
destination of the packet replies. The reply is also broadcasted through the network. Each forwarded request packet also 
triggers the intermediate nodes to send additional request packets. 
Therefore in the beginning of the simulation there is a high amount of AODV related network traffic. After that phase, 
there is only a few additional AODV network traffic required. Detected routes are cached within this implementation, so 
that not every send packets requires a related AODV route request. After the detection of the route, the packet is send.  
Blackhole_AODV_Host-u 
{ 
   pkt_recv(); 
   pkt_resolve(); 
   { 
      If(pkt==data_pkt) 
        Drop 
     } 
     Packet is Lost 
    } 
 
Check Source Routing Table 
{ 
   Check Last_Packet_Sequence_Number Table for    every node 
   Identify Malicious Node 
   If (identified) 
   Broadcast Msg “Malicious Node AODV_Host-“%n””) 
} 
Apply Security Constraints. 
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Evaluation of Results 
Each scenario has two simulations. In the first one every node is working in cooperation with each other to keep the 
network in communication. The second simulation has one malicious node that carries out the Black Hole Attack. To 
evaluate the packet loss, the number of packets that are sent are counted by the sending nodes and how many of them 
reached the receiving nodes.  
The tables below compares the normal and Black Hole networks. In the tables, the second column shows how many 
packets are sent by sending nodes and the third column shows how many of them reached the receiving nodes. By 
calculating the difference between the tables of normal and Black Hole AODV network we try to evaluate how many of 
the packets which could not reach the destination node are absorbed in the Black Hole Node.  
Packets lost in the Black Hole Node are shown in the fourth column of the table of the Black Hole network. The rest of 
the columns show percentage of the packets lost and additionally in the table of Black Hole network, we added 
percentage of loss packets which are absorbed in the Black Hole Node. 
We noticed that the percentage of data loss of the Black Hole AODV is increased more than the normal AODV network 
simulations in all scenarios.  
 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
In this study, the effect of Black Hole attack is analyzed in an AODV Network. For this purpose, AODV protocol is 
implemented that behaves as Black Hole in NS-2. Two scenarios have been implemented where each one has 20 nodes 
that use AODV protocol and also simulated the same scenarios after introducing one Black Hole Node into the network. 
Moreover, a solution has also been implemented that attempted to reduce the Black Hole effects in NS-2 and simulated 
the solution using the same scenarios. Having simulated the Black Hole Attack, it is observed that the packet loss is 
increased in the ad-hoc network. The tables of simulation results show the difference between the number of packets lost 
in the network with and without a Black Hole Attack. This also shows that Black Hole Attack affects the overall network 
connectivity and the data loss could show the existence of the Black Hole Attack in the network.  
It can be seen from Tables, AODV network has normally 5.65 % data loss and if a Black Hole Node is introduced in this 
network data loss is increased to 95.5 %. As 5.65 % data loss already exists in this data traffic, Black Hole Node 
increases this data loss by 89.85 %. When we used secure AODV protocol in the same network, the data loss is 
decreased. 
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Proposed solution for blackhole attack is further enhanced so that blackhole node once identified can be blacklisted in a 
network in a way that every other node in the network is aware of blackhole nature of this particular node and avoids 
sending/receiving data to/from this node. 
Future Work 
Future work includes implanting security constraints on the network so that the communication with the malicious node 
can be strictly avoided. Implementation of this enhancement requires certain changes in AODV protocol. 
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